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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
INTERNATIONAL LAw-DoMESTIC EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ACTS AND LAws-
WHETHER THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO FOREIGN ACm
WHICH VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAw-The United States Supreme Court in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 Sup. Ct. 923 (1964),
recently considered the question of whether the Act of State doctrine1 pre-
cluded the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of a
1 The Act of State doctrine, briefly stated, provides that the courts of the United
States will not inquire into the validity of the acts of a foreign government performed
within its own territory. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83 (1897).
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Cuban expropriation decree which was alleged to be in violation of interna-
tional law.
In the Sabbatino case, the respondent, Farr, Whitlock and Company,
American commodity brokers, had contracted to purchase a quantity of
sugar from a Cuban corporation, Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey
de Cuba (C.A.V.). It was agreed that Farr, Whitlock would pay for the sugar
in New York upon presentation of the shipping documents and a sight
draft. Prior to shipment of the sugar from Cuba, the President of the United
States acted to reduce the Cuban sugar quota.2 The Cuban government
retaliated by ordering the forced expropriation of property or enterprises in
which American nationals had an interest, including the properties of
C.A.V., whose capital stock was principally owned by United States resi-
dents. The sugar, which had previously been placed aboard ship, was seized
by the Cuban government, and permission to allow its shipment under the
contract between Farr, Whitlock and C.A.V. was denied.
In order to obtain delivery of the sugar, Farr, Whitlock entered into
new contracts with Banco Exterio de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban
government. After the sugar was delivered, petitioner, an assignee of Banco
Exterio, presented the bills of lading and sought payment from Farr, Whit-
lock. Farr, Whitlock refused to make payment, having received notification
that C.A.V. was also claiming to be the rightful owner and entitled to pay-
ment for the sugar.
Petitioner, Banco Nacional then brought suit against Farr, Whitlock
in Federal District Court.3 Alleging conversion, it sought to recover pay-
ment for the sugar. Farr, Whitlock, in answer to the complaint, stated that
the expropriation decree violated international law and therefore peti-
tioner's title to the sugar was invalid. Petitioner replied that the Act of State
doctrine precluded the courts of this country from passing on the validity of
the Cuban decree. The District Court held that the Cuban expropriation
decree was violative of international law in three respects: it was retalia-
tory and not for a public purpose; it was discriminatory; and it did not pro-
vide adequate compensation. While recognizing the existence of the Act
of State doctrine, the court held that the doctrine was not applicable to
foreign acts which are clearly in violation of international law. Summary
judgment was therefore granted against petitioner.
The Court of Appeals affirmed 4 and the United States Supreme Court,
after granting certiorari,5 reversed, holding that the Act of State doctrine
is applicable to foreign acts of state even if they violate international law.6
2 Exec. Order No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960).
3 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 372 U.S. 905, 83 Sup. Ct. 717 (1963).
6 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 Sup. Ct. 923 (1964).
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The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan, stated that " . . .
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, . . . even if the complaint
alleges that the taking violates customary international law." 7
In reaching its decision, the Court relied principally on three prior
decision: Underhill v. Hernandez;s Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.;9 and
Ricaud v. American Metal Co.lO In the Underhill case, an American citizen
sued for damages claiming that he had been assaulted by Hernandez, a
military commander in a revolutionary Venezuelan government. Since the
United States had recognized the revolutionary government prior to the
suit, the Court, applying the traditional version of the Act of State doctrine,
refused to inquire into the acts of Hernandez, stating that, "Every sover-
eign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
state and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory."'"
The principles established in the Underhill case were extended in the
Oetjen case to include foreign confiscatory acts. It was found that General
Villa, conducting military operations in Mexico under the Carranza govern-
ment, had confiscated a quantity of hides from a Mexican citizen. The
hides were subsequently sold to a Texas corporation and became the sub-
ject matter of a replevin action brought by an assignee of the original
owner. The Court, noting that the Carranza government had been rec-
ognized by this country at the time of the confiscation, refused to examine
the validity of the confiscations, and stated: "To permit the validity of the
acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the
courts of another would very certainly imperil the amicable relations be-
tween governments and vex the peace of nations."' 12
The facts in the Ricaud case were similar to those in Oetjen, except
that the property confiscated belonged to a United States citizen. The
Court, relying on the principles established by Underhill and Oetjen, re-
fused to inquire into the seizure.
Relying on these three prior cases, the majority opinion in Sabbatino
stressed the fact that international law neither requires the Act of State
doctrine nor does it forbid the doctrine's application. The Court reasoned
7 Id. at 428, 84 Sup. Ct. at 940.
8 168 U.S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83 (1897).
9 246 U.S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309 (1918).
10 246 U.S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 312 (1918). For other cases developing and applying the
Act of State doctrine, see: United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 Sup. Ct. 758 (1936);
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511 (1908); Hudson v.
Guestier, 4 Cranch 293, 2 L. Ed. 625 (1808); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dali. 199, 1 L. Ed. 568
(1796); Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (1674).
11 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 Sup. Ct. 83, 84 (1897).
12 oetjen v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303, 38 Sup. Ct. 309, 311 (1918).
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that the doctrine arises not as an express constitutional requirement, but
rather from a recognition that the conduct of foreign relations, in a system
of separation of powers, is primarily committed to the Executive branch
of the government, and that inquiries into the validity of foreign acts of
state might either embarrass the executive branch or conflict with its aims.
Addressing itself to this point the Court said:
If the Executive Branch has undertaken negotiations with an ex-
propriating country, but has refrained from claims of violation of
the law of nations, a determination to that effect by a court might
be regarded as a serious insult, while a finding of compliance with
international law would greatly strengthen the bargaining hand
of the other State with consequent detriment to American interests
. . . .Considerably more serious and far-reaching consequences
would flow from a judicial finding that international law standards
had been met if that determination flew in the face of a State
Department proclamation to the contrary.18
The majority opinion also stressed the availability of diplomatic
channels as a means of obtaining relief when acts of a foreign sovereign
are questioned. The Court felt that the variety of means available to the
Executive to persuade or coerce fair treatment for American nationals
causes the effect of judicial invalidation of expropriative acts to dwindle in
comparison.
It was also urged that the Act of State doctrine should be applied to
violations of international law only at the insistence of the Executive. The
Court rejected this contention, reasoning that often the Executive branch
does not wish to take an official position, particulary at a time which would
be inopportune diplomatically. In addition, the Court pointed out that,
"It is highly questionable whether the examination of validity by the judi-
ciary should depend on an educated guess by the Executive .... 14
Mr. Justice White, who delivered the only dissenting opinion, observed
that under the rules advanced by the majority, the courts would be placed
in the unenviable position of being powerless to question acts which are
clearly in violation of international law and yet likewise powerless to refuse
to pass on the issues in claims founded on those acts. He reasoned that,
International law ...provides an ascertainable standard for ad-
judicating the validity of foreign acts and courts are competent to
apply this body of law, notwithstanding that there may be some
cases where comity dictates giving effect to the foreign act because
it is not clearly condemned under generally accepted principles
of international law.15
13 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432, 84 Sup. Ct. 923, 942
(1964).
14 Id. at 436, 84 Sup. Ct. at 944.
15 Id. at 461, 84 Sup. Ct. at 958.
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The position taken by the majority in this case is that the Act of
State doctrine is a necessary corollary to the recognized authority of the
Executive to direct foreign relations, and that all foreign acts, even
those in violation of international law, shall be shielded from inquiry out
of deference to or fear of conflict with the Executive. This position may be
further justified on the grounds that domestic courts possess only limited
ability to examine acts which take place in foreign territories. In addition,
the difficulties of enforcement and the natural tendency of domestic courts
to formulate universal principles of international law, which may be no
more than expressions of national foreign policy,16 lend support to the
majority's holding.
On the other hand, the Court should avoid the mechanical extension
of a rule which deprives the Court of its power to adjudicate issues on their
merits and to administer justice to litigants properly before it.17 The deci-
sion reached by the majority in the Sabbatino case will prevent the courts
of the United States from passing on the validity of foreign acts regardless
of how flagrantly international law has been violated and regardless of
whether any conflict with or embarrassment of the Executive would actually
result. A litigant contesting the validity of a foreign act will be left to the
rather complex and often illusory methods of obtaining relief through
diplomatic channels.
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution states that, "The
judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies ... between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Clearly, con-
troversies of the type here under discussion are within the judicial power.
In addition, since international law is part of the law administered by the
courts of the United States,' 8 it is submitted that the Supreme Court has
not only the power, but the duty, to dispose of cases properly brought be-
fore it, including those involving foreign acts which violate international
law. While a policy which promotes uniformity and cooperation between
the judicial and political branches in the area of foreign affairs is to be
favored, it seems that such a policy should not be extended where it results
in substantial injustice to one of the litigants. 19 These principles have been
clearly summarized by Story:
16 Comment, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1278, 1310 (1962); Falk, Toward a Theory of the
Participation of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1961).
17 "... [T]here is no reason for the courts to abdicate their function . . . in those
cases in which there is at stake no matter of international law substantially affecting the
national interest." Franck, The Courts, the State Department and National Policy: A
Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 1112, 1123 (1960). See also Mann,
The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. Rev. 42 (1943).
18 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 Sup. Ct. 290 (1900).
19 "By a consistent use of the principles of private international law, a proper
deference to the dearly expressed policies of the Executive, and by an intelligent use of
judicial discretion, it should be possible to recognize and give effect to all such foreign
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And, certainly, there can be no pretence to say, that any foreign
nation has a right to require the full recognition and execution
of its own laws in other territories, when those laws are deemed
oppressive or injurious to the rights or interests of the inhabitants
ot the latter, or when their moral character is questionable or their
provisions are impolitic or unjust.20
The decision reached by the majority, extending the Act of State doc-
trine to foreign acts which violate international law, is another step towards
defining the role of domestic courts in the areas of foreign relations and
international law.
T. F. LYSAUGHT
WITNESSES-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-INSURED'S STATEMENT TO IN-
SURER REMAINS PRIVILEGED ALTHOUGH TRANSMITTED TO ATTORNEY DEFEND-
ING INSURED ON CRIMINAL CHARGE-In People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197
N.E.2d 15 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court was confronted with the ques-
tions of (1) whether an insured's written statement given to her liability
insurance carrier's investigator regarding the details of an accident she was
involved in was within the attorney-client privilege, and (2) whether the
transmittal of such statement, with her consent, to the attorney defending
her on a criminal charge arising out of the same accident was a voluntary
waiver of the privilege, thereby subjecting the statement to discovery by
the prosecutor. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Ap-
pellate Court' for the Third District and held that the insured's statement
given to her insurer was within the attorney-client privilege and not subject
to discovery by the State, while in control of the insurer, or even after trans-
mittal, with the insured's consent, to her attorney for use in defending her
in a criminal proceeding.
On February 18, 1961, Della Emberton was involved in an automobile-
truck collision resulting in the death of two persons. At the time of the
accident, Mrs. Emberton carried a public liability insurance policy, whereby
her insurance carrier agreed to defend and pay all claims for personal
acts of state which do not conflict with the fundamental concepts of justice and morality
prevailing in the international community." Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am.
J..Int'l L. 826,-852 (1959).
20 Story, Conflict of Laws § 33 (3d ed. 1846).
I The Appellate Court said that the insured's statement would be privileged while in
the insurance carrier's hands or if transmitted to the attorney of its choice in defending
the insured. However, the court held that the privilege was waived when transmitted to
Ryan for use in defending Della Emberton against the criminal charge, a use entirely
different from that which the statement was originally intended. Ryan was considered to
be a mere third party to whom a privileged communication was revealed with consent of
the person entitled to assert the privilege (the insured), thereby waiving the privilege.
People v. Ryan, 40 Ill. App. 2d 352, 189 N.E.2d 763 (3d Dist. 1963).
